INTRODUCTION
It is submitted that cross-border trading in securities has caused a great number of challenges for various national regulators, especially with regard to the recommend, where applicable, possible anti-market abuse measures that could be employed to enhance the curbing of market abuse activities in their respective jurisdictions. Thereafter, some concluding remarks will be provided.
OVERVIEW OF THE ROLE-PLAYERS IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EU MARKET ABUSE DIRECTIVE
A general analysis 9 of the implementation of the EU Market Abuse Directive by the selected role players in the EU will be undertaken in this part of the article. This will be done by, inter alia, discussing the approaches employed by such role players to enforce and implement the provisions of the EU Market Abuse Directive. Thereafter, a brief comparative analysis of the role players in the EU and South Africa will be undertaken.
The role of the FESCO
The FESCO was introduced in December 1997 as an independent organisation which oversees the public supervisory authorities (regulatory bodies) in the EU Member States. 10 The FESCO was among the first proponents of a common administrative regime on market abuse across the EU capital markets. 11 However, the FESCO was replaced by the CESR. 12 Consequently, the role of the FESCO will not be discussed in much detail here, as there will be a greater focus on the role of its successor, the CESR, which will be analysed below.
The role of the CESR
Unlike its predecessor, the CESR was formed in June 2001 by the European Commission (EC) as an independent committee which polices the enforcement of the EU Market Abuse Directive's market abuse provisions by the relevant securities regulators in the EU Member States. 13 Moreover, the CESR is one of the committees which were incorporated in the final report of the Committee of the Wise Men on the regulation of the EU securities markets. 14 9 Notably, this analysis is not limited to the role players in any particular EU Member State. 10 See the FESCO "Forum of European securities commissions, market abuse: FESCO's response to call for views from the securities regulators under the EU's Action Plan for financial services com (1999) 232" (1999) The functions of the CESR are outlined in its Charter, and they include, among others, to improve co-ordination between different securities regulators in the Member States. This further involves developing effective operational network mechanisms to improve the day-to-day consistent supervision and enforcement of the single market for financial services in the Member States. In relation to this, it should be pointed out that the CESR has been instrumental in the signing by all Member States of a Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding regarding, inter alia, the sharing of relevant information and co-operation between the regulatory authorities in order to combat cross-border market abuse activities. 15 In addition, the CESR acts as an advisory group that assists the EUC, including advising the Commission on its preparatory draft implementing measures for the EU framework directives relating to securities. This has, in a way, enhanced the integration and harmonisation of the EU securities markets and the promotion of flexible adjustment of the relevant laws in the Member States to conform to the requirements of the EU Market Abuse Directive. 16 The CESR also runs some operational groups and special expert groups which carry out certain mandates on behalf of the EC. Specifically, such operational groups include the Committee of European Securities Commissions Regulators Enforcement Sub-comittee on Political Relations (CESR-Pol) which promotes co-operation between the supervisory authorities of the EU Member States. The CESR-Pol is staffed by specialists who ensure that securities regulators exchange relevant confidential information. On the other hand, the Committee of European Securities Commissions Regulators Financial Information and Reporting (CESR-Fin) provides guidance on the harmonised supervision of accounting standards in the EU and the Review Panel promotes the effective implementation of the requirements of the CESR in the Member States. 17 In a nutshell, the CESR has to date played a key role in the formulation of a number of harmonised approaches for the EU securities regulators in order for them to implement the relevant securities legislation and in the promotion of a common interpretation and application of the provisions of the EU Market Abuse Directive in all Member States. 18 For example, the CESR has successfully enumerated a number of administrative sanctions and measures applicable to all the Member States. 19 The CESR has, on a number of occasions, invited competent regulatory bodies from the Member States and other relevant stakeholders (academics and market participants) to share their experience and views regarding the practical implementation of the EU Market Abuse Directive. 20 This enabled the role of the European Securities Committee (ESC) to be reviewed and eventually replaced by the ESMA which now oversees the regulation and enforcement of the market abuse prohibition by the EU Member States. 21 In addition, on 2 November 2006 the CESR published a comprehensive Level 3 consultation document addressing various concerns regarding the definition of inside information, client orders constituting inside information, and the recording of insider lists. 22
The role of the EU's Action Plan for Financial Services
The EU's Action Plan for Financial Services was perhaps one of the most ambitious programmes of legislative activity. It was aimed at formulating a common securities capital market in Europe. 23 In addition, the EU's Action Plan for Financial Services was formally proposed by the EUC in 1998. 
The role of the Lamfalussy Process and the Committee of the Wise Men
In order to fully implement the EU's Action Plan for Financial Services, 
Synoptical comparative evaluation and analysis of the role of regulators and other role players
Like the initial position in the EU where the market abuse regulatory authority was vested in the FESCO, 41 such regulatory functions were a joint responsibility of the Registrar of Companies, the Department of Justice (DOJ) 42 and the Securities Regulation Panel (SRP) 43 prior to 1998 in South Africa. 44 Moreover, like the CESR, 45 the FSB 46 replaced all the previous regulatory authorities and it bears the main responsibility to oversee the enforcement of market abuse provisions in South Africa. 47 Additionally, as is the position under the EU, 48 the FSB has its own established committees, namely, the DMA 49 which is an investigatory arm of the FSB, and the Notwithstanding the few flaws stated above, the FSB has to date fairly managed to perform its duties in relation to the enforcement of the market abuse prohibition, 59 which include, inter alia, investigating market abuse violations; 60 making market abuse rules; 61 interrogating any persons accused of violating the market abuse provisions; 62 and instituting administrative and other appropriate proceedings against any persons who commit market abuse offences. 63 However, unlike the Committee of the Wise Men's committees, namely the CESR, and the ESMA (including the repealed ESC), 64 the FSB (including its committees, the DMA and the Enforcement Committee) has no authority to oversee the enforcement of securities and market abuse laws by similar regulatory bodies across the African Union Member States. 65 This is influenced, in part, by the fact that there is no legislation similar to the EU Market Abuse Directive 66 which has been specifically enacted to harmonise the enforcement of the securities and market abuse laws in Africa. 67 Accordingly, the FSB's powers are primarily limited to the implementation and enforcement of the market abuse provisions in South Africa. 68 Nonetheless, in relation to this, it is noteworthy that the FSB is statutorily empowered to assist foreign regulators with investigations pertaining to any cross-border market abuse cases. 69 In light of this, the FSB has forged some multilateral co-operation agreements with likeminded authorities in the developed world, such as, the Financial Services Authority and the United States Securities and Exchange Commission in a bid to combat crossborder market abuse activities. 70 
CONCLUDING REMARKS
As indicated above, 71 various regulatory and enforcement efforts were made in a bid to enhance the combatting of market abuse practices in both the South African and the EU financial markets. For instance, as previously stated, 72 the EU Market Abuse Directive 73 was probably one of the most ambitious regulatory frameworks ever to be adopted regarding the prohibition of market abuse activities in the EU. In addition, several committees, commissions and regulatory bodies were introduced from time to time in an attempt to deter and discourage all the relevant persons from committing market abuse offences in the EU. 74 Similarly, various anti-market abuse legislation, committees, commissions and regulatory bodies were introduced from time to time to discourage all unscrupulous persons from indulging in market abuse and other illicit trading activities in South Africa. 75 However, notwithstanding these commendable efforts and measures that were, and are still, clearly targeted at improving the detection and prevention of market abuse activities in the EU and South African financial markets, both the South African market abuse legislation and the EU Market Abuse Directive's regulatory framework have a considerable number of flaws. For instance, some EU Member States have sometimes inconsistently applied heterogeneous enforcement approaches in a bid to implement the EU Market Abuse Directive for the purposes of combatting market abuse practices in their respective financial markets. 76 Moreover, there are no specific provisions that provide adequate practical measures and/or guidelines regarding the uniform application of the EU Market Abuse Directive's provisions in the EU Member States to avoid balkanisation and other potential over-regulation problems. 77 Similarly, very few cross-border market abuse cases have been successfully investigated and prosecuted in South Africa. 78 Additionally, the South African market abuse prohibition is primarily limited to discouraging only insider trading and market manipulation practices. 79 Consequently, other related illicit trading practices, such as, high frequency trading, short selling, credit default swaps and front running, are not expressly and statutorily outlawed under the Financial Markets Act. 80 Furthermore, other anti-market abuse enforcement approaches, such as, whistle-blower immunity provisions and bounty rewards are not expressly and statutorily employed to encourage all persons to report market abuse violations to the relevant enforcement authorities in South Africa. 81 Given this background, it submitted that the EU Market Abuse Directive should be amended to embody specific provisions that provide for adequate practical measures and/or guidelines regarding the uniform application of the EU Market Abuse Directive's provisions across the EU Member States. It is also recommended that such measures and/or guidelines should be carefully incorporated into the relevant provisions of the recently adopted new EU Market Abuse Directive 82 and the new Criminal Sanctions Market Abuse Directive. 83 In the same vein, it is also recommended that South Africa's Financial Markets Act should be amended to contain specific provisions for other antimarket abuse enforcement approaches, such as, whistle-blower immunity provisions and bounty rewards, for the purpose of encouraging all persons to report market abuse activities to the FSB and/or other relevant enforcement authorities in South Africa.
It is further submitted that the bounty rewards and whistle-blower immunity provisions should be carefully and consistently utilised in both South Africa and the EU Member States to minimise the risk of discouraging potential investors, which is generally associated with overregulation. 84 Lastly, it is submitted that the Financial Markets Act should be reviewed to embody provisions which broadly extend the scope of its market abuse prohibition to expressly cover other related illicit trading practices, such as, high frequency trading, short selling, credit default swaps and front running, to enable the FSB and other relevant regulatory authorities to curb the market abuse challenges posed by such practices in South Africa.
